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Abstract
Present research aims at the introduction of the term “Fiscal Trap” in
economic literature, as a comprehensive definition of the economic
situation in which any available combination of fiscal-only policy
measures (tax increases and austerity measures), would fail to fulfill fiscal
targets during periods of recession. Using recent experience from the case
of Greece, an ex-post evaluation of adopted policy effectiveness is
pursued. Fiscal austerity and increased taxation enforced in Greece during
the years 2009-2012, resulted in decreased tax revenues, lower GDP and
increased debt-to-GDP ratio. In order to slip away from the vicious cycle
generated by austerity and tax hikes, policymakers might need the help of
an appropriate monetary stimulus.
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1. Introduction
Policymakers have two major available instruments, monetary and fiscal. Monetary
instruments allow for changes in the supply, availability and cost of money in order to
promote economic growth, employment and price stability. Even though monetary
policy is usually exercised by “independent” institutions as the Central Banks, they are
assumed to conform with and serve the economic interests of society. On the fiscal side,
the two main instruments of fiscal policy are government taxation and expenditure.
Changes in the level and composition of taxation and government spending can impact
aggregate demand, the level of economic activity, income distribution and resource
allocation.
Fiscal policy can be characterized as neutral, expansionary or contractionary, when
expenditure equals, exceeds or falls short of tax revenue respectively. Expansionary
fiscal policy can be used to boost the level of economic activity. Alternatively, when the
economy may be doing a little too well, the need of slowing down can be attained by a
contractionary fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy has been in the midst of political and theoretical debate, since the outbreak
of the global financial crisis. Debate focuses on the effectiveness of fiscal policy under
conditions of recession, global financial crisis and increased sovereign debt. Fiscal
conservatives advocate budget balancing to be the superior goal for any prudent fiscal
policy, while (post) Keynesian economists argue that reducing budget deficit when the
economy is already depressed, produces a negative self-reinforced spiral effect on tax
base. Present research aims at the introduction of the term “Fiscal Trap” in economic
literature, as a comprehensive definition of the economic situation in which any available
combination of fiscal-only policy measures, would fail to fulfill fiscal targets during
periods of recession. Using recent experience from Greece, an ex-post evaluation of
adopted policy effectiveness is pursued.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Part two explores the Fiscal Trap within the
context of the Laffer curve literature, part three discusses fiscal policy limitations within
the EMU framework, part four presents evidence from Greece and part five concludes.

2. Fiscal Trap in the Laffer curve context
Fiscal Trap can be seen as a special type of Laffer effect. The Laffer curve (Fig. 1)
depicts the relationship between tax rates and tax revenues. As tax rates increase from 0
to 100 percent, tax revenues increase from zero to a maximum level (at t*) and then fall
back towards zero. Laffer’s reasoning was that lower tax rates stimulate incentives to
work resulting in expansion of real output and income. To the contrary, higher tax rates
discourage economic activity, thereby shrinking the tax base. A marginal tax rate
increase would produce tax revenue increase only if the initial tax rate was lower than the
4
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optimum t*. Starting from a tax rate higher than t*, any marginal tax rate increase would
decrease total tax revenue.
FIGURE 1: LAFFER CURVE

Busato, Chiarini & Rey (2009), study the equilibrium effects of fiscal policy disturbances
within a dynamic general equilibrium model where tax evasion and underground
activities are explicitly incorporated. They find income elasticity to tax rate increases
under tax evasion to be almost zero.
Vogel (2012) adds an informal sector in the form of home production as alternative to
activity in the official sector. Contrary to the results of Busato et al (2009), he concludes
that higher substitutability between market and home production “flattens” the Laffer
curves for labor and corporate taxation, reducing the effectiveness of tax increases.
Papp & Takats (2008) argue that tax rate cuts may increase revenues by improving tax
compliance. Small tax rate cuts decreasing incentives to evade taxes, can lead to
increased revenues. Their model is consistent with what happened in Russia, when tax
revenues increased substantially and almost immediately after the introduction of flat
taxes, and effective personal income tax rate cuts.
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3. Fiscal Policy, Sovereign Debt and the European Monetary
Union
Within European Union, available government intervention tools vary across countries.
Countries with own currency such as Great Britain and Sweden can use both fiscal and
monetary tools. Monetary policy is not an instrument available to policymakers in
countries belonging to the European Monetary Union (EMU). As such, the only
available policy instruments engaged by local EMU national governments are fiscal.
Becsi (2000) relates the outcome of tax rate changes with changes in the pattern of
government spending, providing a higher multiplier effect on capital spending compared
to consumption. He concludes that raising public investment relative to public
consumption will tend to add to tax revenues by increasing the tax base. The
implications for the debt burdened countries are obvious. Increase in tax rates directed
towards the repayment of debt has no multiplier effect, shifting the Laffer curve
downwards and producing lower tax revenues.
Trabandt & Uhlig (2010) present Laffer curves for labor and corporate income taxation in
a neoclassical growth model with perfect competition. They derive Laffer curves for the
US, the EU aggregate and individual EU member states. Trabandt & Uhlig (2012) while
extending their work of 2010, find that following the Eurozone crisis, all EU 14 countries
moved closer to the peak of the labor tax Laffer curve, limiting the ability to further raise
taxes.
New Keynesian proponents as Hannsgen (2012) argue that Europe is “now stuck in a
fiscal trap, brought about by the failure of orthodox economics to provide an effective
strategy for economic growth”. While there might not be enough evidence for the
positioning of the whole of European economy within the “Fiscal Trap”, there is plenty
of such evidence for Greece.
Excess sovereign debt accumulation, in Greece and most of the South European
countries, stems from chronic government overspending. Increased debt service burden
necessitates fiscal action such as tax revenue increases and/or government spending cuts.
Both policies increase the probability for the instigation of a negative spiraling effect
resulting in further deterioration of the causal effects. Fiscal stimuli might be effective
up to the point their marginal multiplicative output effect equals the corresponding
marginal debt service increase.

4. A brief chronology of events, the case of Greece
While sustaining a steady growth during the 1990’s, Greece was awarded the 2004
Olympic Games in 1999, was accepted to the EMU in 2000 and adopted the Euro on
January 1st, 2002. Since entering the Euro-zone in 2002 and until 2007, Greek public
debt while increasing in nominal amount was kept almost constant as a percentage of
GDP, mainly due to strong domestic GDP growth. During the same period, debt service
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cost decreased significantly, due to the decrease in effective bond yields. Greek bond
spreads over German bond yields were contained within thirty (30) basis points. While
debt seemed to be manageable up to that point, the situation deteriorated drastically in
2008 and 2009, when Greece added fifty six billion euro (€56 B) to its debt, while facing
a global prolonged recession. Global economic crisis, stemming from the default of the
subprime mortgage market in the US, had a dual economic impact on Greece. First,
increased borrowing (by approximately €28 B) in order to provide necessary liquidity to
banks; and second, increased effective borrowing rates due to global credit rationing.
The effect of rising borrowing rates was augmented by subsequent rating downgrades,
making the burden of Greek debt non-manageable within markets.
As a result, on April 23, 2010, Greek government called for a joint Eurozone – IMF
rescue plan, inaugurating the first Greek debt crisis. On May 2, 2010, Eurozone finance
ministers agreed to rescue Greece providing one hundred ten billion euro (€110 B) loan
facility to be disbursed over the following three years, under the conditions of strict fiscal
policy as dictated in the “Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies” (MEFP)
signed by the minister of Finance and the governor of The Central Bank of Greece.
Following the MEFP agreement, a first wave of austerity measures was taken, while
corresponding legislation facilitating the implementation of such measures were enacted.
While most of the market participants were satisfied with the bailout plan, several others
viewed the measures with skepticism. The skepticism was based on the observation that
domestic economy was predominately “government fed”, and austerity measures would
deteriorate unemployment, blowing downwards consumption and GDP. Also, relative
rigidity of expenses might result in further deterioration of public deficit and the debt
burden itself. Actually, not a year later (April 23, 2011), the European Commission
announced that Greek public deficit for 2010 was worse than initially expected (at 13.6%
of GDP) and austerity measures of the MEFP were ineffective.
Responding to pressure from the Lenders, Greek Parliament enacted a second set of
austerity measures on June 29, 2011, increasing various types of direct and indirect taxes,
while cutting further wages, expenses in the government sector and public investment.
Furthermore, in order to increase labor productivity, measures were extended to private
sector.
The two waves of austerity imposed on May 2010 and June 2011, proved inadequate and
ineffective in bringing the targeted fiscal results. The second phase of the crisis
continued until a new agreement was reached between the Greek government, European
Commission and IMF on February 21 2012, calling for a 53.5% “haircut” in the nominal
face value of Greek debt held by private investors. Along with debt haircut, a new set of
loans was arranged, totaling one hundred thirty billion euro (€130 B), needed in time
between other, to refinance fourteen billion euro (€14 B) of government bonds expiring
on March 20 2012, as well as to finance current budget deficit. In return for the above, a
third wave of austerity measures including 22% cuts off the minimum wage, 15% off
pensions and 15,000 public sector jobs was undertaken. Official unemployment rose to
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22%, a new record of all times, while real unemployment devastated over one third of
work force.
Fiscal austerity enforced in Greece during the years 2009-2012, resulted in increased
debt, decreased GDP and decreased tax revenues, as shown in the appendix tables. The
main negative social effect of the policies adopted was the unprecedented increase in
unemployment (26.8% Eurostat, Dec 2012). The results shown are characteristic of the
ineffectiveness of fiscal-only policy measures under conditions of recession, providing
for a “textbook” Laffer effect. In particular, the effective income tax rate (table 2)
increased between 29% and 1000% in the main categories (income less than €26.000),
while VAT tax increased between 21% and 44% (table 3) depending on the category of
goods. Increased tax rates as shown above combined with introduction of new taxes,
actually managed to produce 7.6% net tax revenue decrease, while plummeting real GDP
by almost 20% and skyrocketing debt-to-GDP ratio at 170%.

5. Conclusions
Fiscal Trap is introduced as a special Laffer effect during recessionary periods, taking
into consideration the extent of sovereign debt burden and the availability of alternative
policy measures.
Present research establishes the term “Fiscal Trap” as the
comprehensive definition of that economic situation in which contractionary
combinations of fiscal-only policy measures (tax increases and/or austerity measures),
would fail to accomplish fiscal targets during recession.
Existence of increased government debt curries a built-in perverse incentive implying
that government would be less inclined to adopt a fiscal stimulus and could, instead, be
forced to raise tax rates in order to accommodate for the increased debt burden. At the
same time, in an effort to drive towards a balanced budget, austerity measures can be
imposed, cutting public investment and spending. Both government initiatives taken in
an open economy deprived of its sovereign monetary policy may easily end up not
attaining the intended purpose. When all the above measures are taken within the term of
a global recession, then the situation provides the conditions for the development of an
effective Fiscal Trap.
Fiscal developments in Greece, where tax rate increases combined with austerity
measures resulted in decreasing tax revenues and increasing debt burden, provide proof
of existence for the Fiscal Trap. Implications for policymakers in countries with
increased sovereign debt are obvious. Fiscal-only policy measures are unable to fulfill
satisfactory fiscal targets, especially during a period of recession. In order to slip away
from the vicious cycle generated by austerity and tax hikes, policymakers might need the
help of an appropriate monetary stimulus.
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APPENDIX OF TABLES
Table 1: Key Economic Indicators
In current
€ Billion

2004

2005

2006

2007

GDP

185

193

209

223

232

231

227

215

201.4

TAX
REVENUE

70.5

75.3

81.9

91.0

94.7

88.6

90.2

87.9

87.5

TOTAL
DEBT

183.2

212.3

224.7

239.9

263

299

329

355

344

AS % OF
GDP
BUDGET
DEFICIT
% of GDP

98.9% 110.0% 107.7% 107.5% 113% 129% 145% 165% 170%
7.5%

5.2%

5.7%

6.5%

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012*

9.8% 15.6% 10.3% 9.1%

7.5%

*estimates

Table 2: Taxation increase per income bracket

2009

in €

Income

Tax

5,000
0
12,000
0
16,000
720
26,000 3,200
40,000 8,000
60,000 15,600
100,000 31,600

2012

Effective
Tax Rate

Tax

2010‐2014

Effective
Tax Rate

0
0%
0%
700
5% 1,420
12% 3,920
20% 8,820
26% 16,420
32% 32,420

0%
6%
9%
15%
22%
27%
32%

Additional
Effective
Excise
Tax Rate
Tax
0
0%
0
0%
40
0%
200
1%
480
1%
980
2%
2,180
2%

2009‐
2012
Eff.
Rate
Increase
0%
999%
103%
29%
16%
12%
9%
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Table 3: Change in VAT tax per product category

1987‐1992
1992‐03/2005
04/2005‐03/2010
04/2010‐06/2010
07/2010‐12/2010
2011
% Change

HIGH REGULAR
36%
18%
18%
19%
21%
23%
23%

LOW
8%
8%
9%
10%
11%
13%

SUBSIDIZED
4%
4%
4.5%
5%
5.5%
6.5%

21%

44%

44%

2010‐2011

Table 4: Table of changes in debt, GDP and tax revenue
ECONOMIC FIGURES CHANGE BETWEEN 2008 and 2012*

GREECE

%**
DEBT / GDP

% Change
Tax Revenue

% Change
GDP***

58.1%

-7.6%

-18.3%

Data source: IMF
*2012 figures are estimates
**2012% minus 2008%
***Constant prices
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